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ABSTRACT
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) offer an opportunity to explore the use of evidence to inform public
policy and commissioning decisions in both discursive and practical terms in what are
frequently highly politicized contexts. We identify three potential mechanisms by which SIBs
may promote evidence use and explore these through empirical findings drawn from a
three-year evaluation of SIBs applied to health and social care in the English NHS.
IMPACT
This paper highlights three mechanisms by which SIBs may encourage evidence-informed
policy-making. First, the ability of SIB financing to promote specific interventions for which a
positive evidence base already exists. Second, the opportunities that SIB-financed
programmes offer for the promotion of evidence use through improved local data collection
practices. Third, the opportunities that SIB-financed interventions offer for formal evaluation.
The authors tested these mechanisms; the implications of the results for policy-makers,
public managers and other interested parties are presented in the paper.
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Introduction
Globally, governments are exploring innovative ways of
procuring public services to improve effectiveness and
efficiency. A high-profile example of this trend over
the past decade is the development of Social Impact
Bonds (SIBs). SIBs are pay-for-performance schemes in
which private for-profit or social investors (who seek a
blend of financial return and social good) provide
some up-front finance towards the delivery of a public
service and subsequently may receive an outcomes-
based rate of return. A key attraction of the SIB model
for governments is that they should only pay for ‘what
works’ (Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo’sher, 2011). A
concern for ‘what works’ builds on advocacy of
evidence-informed policy and practice (EIPP) directed
at policy-makers, practitioners and researchers over
recent years (Boaz, Davies, Fraser, & Nutley, 2019).
In this paper,weexplore the relationshipbetweenSIBs
and EIPP. This is important because this relationship is
somewhat ambiguous (Maier, Barbetta, & Godina,
2018). While some SIB proponents emphasise the
promise that SIBs hold for furthering evidence-informed
interventions or practices (Mulgan et al., 2011), other
authors have highlighted potential epistemological
(Warner, 2013), ethical (Roy, McHugh, & Sinclair, 2017),
and practical (Edmiston & Nicholls, 2017) concerns in
the relationship between SIBs and evidence. These
conflicting viewpoints reflect the competing narratives
discerned in the literature more broadly. Proponents
emphasise the promise of SIBs as a ‘win–win–win’
policy tool (i.e. one that delivers better social outcomes
for service users, cost-savings to government and a
return to investors). In contrast, critics urge caution
about the potentially damaging implications of the SIB
concept (Fraser, Tan, Lagarde, & Mays, 2018a).
We present findings from a three-year evaluation of
the first SIBs focused on health and social care in the
English NHS (Fraser et al., 2018b), identifying three
potential mechanisms by which SIBs may promote
EIPP and exploring these through the evaluation’s
findings. In theoretical terms, we situate SIBs within
wider debates linked to both the discursive and
practical use of evidence in policy-making. We argue
that SIBs are a useful lens for understanding evidence
use in policy because evidence is strikingly central to
the claims made by SIB proponents and their critics.
The paper is structured as follows: first we discuss
the relationship between evidence use and SIBs; then
we describe the methods used in this study. Next, the
findings are presented. Finally, the findings are
discussed and the key implications for practitioners
are highlighted.
Evidence use and SIBs
Maier et al. (2018) conducted a review of practitioner
reports on SIBs and identified two key paradoxes
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found in these—first, ‘cost-saving risk transfer to
private investors’ and second, ‘flexible but evidence-
based services’ (Maier et al., 2018, p. 1333). The first is
paradoxical because SIBs have high transaction costs
(beyond those of traditional commissioning) and SIB-
financed initiatives that are rational choices for
governments are unlikely to be attractive to investors
(and vice versa) (Giacomantonio, 2017). ‘Evidence-
based flexibility’ is also paradoxical as it suggests
both conformity to an evidence-based model and
malleability in delivery which may run counter to
model fidelity. Of the 51 practitioner reports reviewed
by Maier et al. (2018), 34 contained the paradox of
‘evidence-based flexibility’. A strategy developed by
practitioner report authors and identified by Maier
et al. to sidestep this apparent contradiction was to
employ a very loose understanding of the terms
‘evidence’ and ‘evidence-based’. Public sector
commissioners face a further contradiction related to
financing interventions that have strong evidence of
success through a SIB, namely, why should they pay
more for a predictable level of success they could
achieve through conventional commissioning?
Beyond SIBs, the language of ‘evidence’ and
‘evidence-based’ change in policy-making has had a
recognized discursive power aligned with positivistic,
managerialist, and ‘post-ideological’ technocratic
assumptions (Newman, 2001) since at least the mid
1990s. Use of an evidential discourse may highlight an
intentionality on the part of SIB proponents that is
worthy of deeper consideration. In policy terms,
aligning SIBs with ‘evidence’ and ‘evidence-based’
interventions may be seen as an attempt to de-
politicize SIBs, and pre-empt some of the ideological
and ethical criticism that has emerged about SIBs on
the grounds that they ‘financialize’ human relations
and social services (Warner, 2013; Roy et al., 2017). A
key question for the commissioning of SIB-financed
interventions is finding a balance between risk, return
and a focus on the social outcomes beyond financial
reward. Strategic attempts to intertwine SIBs within
an ‘evidence-based’ discursive framing are a useful
tactic to validate the policy and focus on the
usefulness of the respective interventions while
distancing SIBs from the more controversial financial
mechanisms they comprise (Warner, 2013). In
practical terms, the pervasive use of the discourse of
‘evidence’ allied to SIBs may be seen as a strategy to
down-play the risk of programme failure in the eyes
of interested stakeholders, especially investors.
The discursive practices identified by Maier et al.
(2018) related to the presentation of SIBs as ‘flexible
yet evidence-based’ draw attention to deeper,
definitional ambiguities in the SIB concept. Indeed,
the idea of what a SIB is, or should be, is imbued
with ‘chameleonic’ characteristics (Smith, 2013). SIBs
demonstrate a high degree of ‘strategic ambiguity’
(Smith, 2013; Eisenberg, 1984). This is to say that SIBs
are amenable to being framed in different ways for
different audiences. More broadly, a feature of a SIB is
that it may be framed as a ‘social’ innovation to those
with a primarily social ethos. At the same time, a SIB
may be framed as a ‘financial’ innovation for those
who wish to emphasise the potential to deliver a
financial return to investors who desire to engage in
‘good works’ (Fraser et al., 2018b). At different times,
the ‘evidence-based’ potential of SIBs or their
potential for ‘flexibility’ may be emphasised (Maier
et al., 2018) by different actors for different purposes.
From a public management perspective, a SIB might
be expected to either shift the risk of failure to an
investor in return for a higher level of public funding
while delivering success in line with intervention
model expectations, or deliver higher performance
against shared and agreed social outcomes (more
social return) in return for some additional cost. The
respective rate of return, depending on the likely
expectations, might be different in each scenario (for
example higher in the case of the former, lower in
the latter)—nonetheless, striking this balance is a key
concern for commissioners.
It is important to cut through some of the
ambiguities and paradoxes that characterize the
relationship between evidence and SIBs in particular
by being clearer about how SIBs may promote or
inhibit the use of evidence through empirical
research on SIB projects. We identify three
mechanisms by which SIBs may be expected to
demonstrate evidence-informed policy-making:
. The ability of SIB financing to promote specific
interventions for which a positive evidence base
already exists (Maier et al., 2018).
. The opportunities that SIB-financed programmes
may offer for the promotion of evidence use
through improved local data collection practices
(Stoesz, 2014).
. The opportunities that SIB-financed interventions
offer for formal evaluation (Fox & Morris, 2019).
Methods
This paper presents findings from a three-year
evaluation of the SIB Trailblazers in Health and Social
Care (Fraser et al., 2018b) funded by the Department
of Health (now the Department of Health and Social
Care) in England. Nine projects—collectively known
as the SIB ‘Trailblazers’—received seed funding in
2013 to explore whether to commission a service
locally through a SIB and, if so, how to set it up.
These projects proposed SIB-financed interventions
targeted at a diverse set of population groups (in
both geographical and target population size terms).
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Likewise, the strength of the evidence behind the
respective interventions was heterogeneous, as
described in Table 1.
The evaluation described and assessed the
development of these projects over time with a view
to considering whether and, if so, how, SIB-financed
services might deliver better outcomes than
alternative financing mechanisms. We drew on
comparative qualitative case study methods (Yin,
2013) to do so. Qualitative case studies are an
appropriate method for exploring issues related to
policy implementation (Fraser & Mays, 2020),
exploring ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions about
phenomena through detailed contextualized
accounts of cases (Yin, 2013). We undertook
qualitative analysis of documents (both local and
national) and conducted interviews with relevant
actors across the Trailblazers including interviews
before and after the decisions were made not to
initiate a SIB for those sites that eventually chose not
to initiate SIB-financed services. For those Trailblazers
which did initiate SIB-financed programmes, we
compared each of these qualitatively with sites
elsewhere in the country that had the same or similar
interventions (for example social prescribing, or
specialist foster care services) serving similar
populations provided by the same or similar
organizations but not financed through a SIB
mechanism. This comparison, though not perfect,
sought to illuminate how the presence of SIB
financing might have affected the management and
delivery of services.
We conducted 177 interviews with 199 informants
across all sites between June 2014 and May 2017
until ‘data saturation’ (Glaser, 1978). We purposively
sampled informants to include commissioners (N = 38
with 32 informants), providers (N = 123 with 109
informants), intermediaries (N = 23 with 13
informants), investors (N = 9 with 10 informants) and
others (N = 5), for example central government, data
analysts or consultants. Most interviews lasted an
hour and were face-to-face, though a number of
interviews were also over the telephone (N = 27).
Many interviews were conducted by two members of
the research team together, and a small number of
interviews was conducted with more than one
informant.
Interview transcripts were coded with the support of
NVivo 10 software. Two members of the research team
analyzed data collaboratively to ensure inter-coder
reliability and interrogated the data repeatedly in
order to understand key issues in relation to the
Trailblazers. We engaged closely with themes
emerging from the data alongside wider theoretical
insights (from the SIB specific and EIPP literature). In
this way, the approach combined both inductive and
deductive elements (Langley, 1999) as part of an
iterative analytical process. The themes derived from
the research questions and objectives of the
evaluation related to the decision to initiate a SIB-
financed project or not; early implementation
challenges where SIBs were commissioned; impacts
of performance management and contract
management decisions and service delivery upon
different actors; the nature of the evidence
underpinning the SIB-financed intervention and the
ability to undertake an attributable evaluation of the
intervention; and broader views of staff about
potential strengths and weaknesses of SIB-financing
mechanisms as they developed and delivered SIB-
financed projects. The interviews in the non-SIB
comparison projects explored similar questions with
the goal of attempting to tease out the main
differences between delivering services with and
without a SIB. The research generated a large volume
of data. In this paper, we draw on a subset of the
data taken from interviews across all sites (where SIBs
were initiated, where they were not and the non-SIB
comparison sites) that focus specifically on the three
aspects of evidence use introduced above.
Findings
The strength of the evidence behind an
intervention financed by a SIB mechanism
The three proposed Trailblazer interventions with the
strongest evidence base were initiated—these were
the Manchester TFCO-A programme, the Newcastle
Ways to Wellness social prescribing programme and
the London Rough Sleeping SIB. There are a number
of trials and a recent systematic review exploring
social prescribing (Bickerdike, Booth, Wilson, Farley, &
Wright, 2017) and academic research into
interventions that aim to improve targeted
adolescent behaviour, including TFCO-A (Evans,
Brown, Rees, & Smith, 2017). Key elements of the
rough sleeping intervention have been evaluated
through quasi-experimental evaluations (Pleace &
Bretherton, 2013) and the ‘Housing First’ principles it
draws on has also been subjected to systematic
review (Fitzpatrick-Lewis et al., 2011).
It is notable that the results of the reviews of these
three interventions are somewhat mixed—and this
may be significant—particularly with respect to social
prescribing. Clinical champions of the Newcastle
social prescribing SIB Trailblazer suggested that a key
aim of the programme (alongside social improvement
and cost savings) was to add to the evidence base
behind social prescribing at scale:
… this is actually a research [project]… you have to be
able to prove it works. And you really do need a cohort of
control patients to say… is it making that much of a
difference? (Clinical champion.)
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Table 1. Description of SIB Trailblazer interventions, their evidence base and evaluations.
Project Aim of project Type of services Outcome metrics
Strength of
evidence behind
the intervention
Local counter
—factual
data
collected
Local
qualitative
evaluation
Status as of
January 2020
Manchester Foster
Care
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care Oregon for
Adolescents™ programme (TFCO-A™) providing
behavioural interventions for 95 children aged 11 to
14 years
Specialized foster care services
providing behavioural interventions
for foster children in family-based
settings
Number of children moved from residential
care to foster placements. ‘Bonus’
outcome metrics: improved school
attendance, better behaviour, and wider
wellbeing
Medium evidence
base
No No Active since 2014
London Thames
Reach
Homelessness
Personalized service pathway for a cohort of 415
entrenched rough sleepers
Navigators monitor cohort closely.
Personalized approach tailored to
individuals (for example assist to
find housing)
Reduction in rough sleeping, move to stable
accommodation, sustained reconnection,
reduced emergency admissions, progress
to employment, education, or
volunteering
Medium evidence
base
Yes Yes Completed
(2012–2015)
Newcastle Ways
to Wellness
Better self-management of long-term conditions
through social prescribing for 14248 people with long
term conditions (LTC) living in West Newcastle
Social prescribing (through Link
workers) (i.e. non-medical
interventions in the local
community to foster sustained
healthy behaviours)
Achieved improvement of the outcomes on
the Wellbeing Star and savings for
secondary care acute usage
Medium evidence
base
Yes Yes Active since 2015
Shared Lives Provide an alternative to care homes for approximately
150 people in need of intensive support in two sites
over 3 years
An alternative to home care and care
homes for people in need of
support, with support instead
provided through living with a host
family
Number of new Shared Lives care
placements established
Weak evidence
base
No No Completed
(2015–2018)
Worcester
Reconnections
Reduce social isolation among older people through
one-to-one tailored support to engage with local
community. 3000 people identified as lonely aged 50
+ years; reduced to 1800 people after contract
renegotiation in Spring 2016
Personalized service packages to
engage individuals in local
community activities (for example
befriending services, gardening
club)
Reduction in self-reported loneliness (using
R-UCLA 12 scale)
Weak evidence
base
No Yes Completed
(2015–2019)
Cornwall Improve wellbeing and health outcomes for older
people
Early interventions for a cohort of
1000 frail older people at risk of
emergency admission
Reduced emergency admissions, improved
wellbeing (Edinburgh and Warwick
mental wellbeing scale)
Weak evidence
base
N/A N/A Not
commissioned
East Lancashire Improve wellbeing and health outcomes for identified
cohort
Provision of patient-specific tailored
health and social care interventions
to reduce isolation, unemployment,
and poor quality of life
Not confirmed. Outcomes would have likely
included reducing isolation and returning
to work or education
Weak evidence
base
N/A N/A Not
commissioned
Leeds Improved specialist neuro-rehabilitation nursing
services
Setting up a 75-bed nursing facility
and creating a community of care
delivering nursing care to a mix of
high-needs people
Not specified in detail. ‘Complex metrics’
used, many outcomes, including money
saved for the government by the
interventions
Weak evidence
base
N/A N/A Not
commissioned
Sandwell and
Birmingham
Improved end-of-life care services Integrated community end-of-life care
services
Increase in proportion of patients dying in
their usual place of residence; decrease in
unplanned emergency admission rate in
final month of life
Weak evidence
base
N/A N/A Not
commissioned
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As part of this Trailblazer, the quasi-experimental
evaluation, including a control group from another
part of the city, performed a dual role. For the clinical
champions, it sought to generate data on the
effectiveness of the social prescribing intervention
itself. For the commissioners, it sought to
demonstrate changes that could be causally
attributed to the intervention itself, thereby justifying
performance-based payments. There were both
experimental and managerial reasons to maintain a
level of rigidity in these metrics. However, this view
was not shared by all parties, one of whom, in the
light of implementation problems, sought to
‘change and flex’ aspects of the intervention metrics
generating tensions amongst other parties.
In the case of the Manchester TFCO-A project, all
parties (commissioners, providers and investors)
valued the fact that the intervention was evidence-
based and had been previously successful in other
places. The commissioners stated that, without SIB
financing and the transfer of implementation risk
away from the local authority that it represented, the
local authority would not have been prepared to pay
for the service:
… it’s not something that we as a local authority would
have invested in because it’s so difficult and so complex
and so challenging in terms of making it work. But…
the risk [is] shared [through the] social impact bond.
And, also, the basis originally of this TFCO…was that
it was really [effective for] offenders (Commissioner).
SIB financing enabled the Manchester team to ring-
fence the budget for staffing the dedicated TFCO-A
social workers required to achieve model fidelity. It
was considered too challenging for the local authority
to be able fund such staffing levels itself in the
context of government financial austerity in the UK.
Indeed, elsewhere in the UK over this period, many
TFCO-A teams financed through conventional local
government means were under immense financial
strain, impeding the delivery of TFCO-A, and leading
to the closure of many services including our non-SIB
comparison site. As with the social prescribing
example above, the SIB-financing mechanism was
central to the initiation of TFCO-A by mitigating the
implementation risk of an intervention which had
numerous social work champions and an emerging (if
contested) evidence base.
In addition, two SIB Trailblazer services lacking
strong evidence of effectiveness were also
commissioned. In the case of Shared Lives, the local
authorities in each site had run in-house Shared Lives
services or had worked in close collaboration with
local third sector organizations (for example
voluntary, community, not-for profit) to deliver the
service to relatively static numbers of service users for
many years. The SIB offered them a way to scale up
the service and potentially realize cost-savings locally.
So, while there is little rigorous research evidence on
the effectiveness of Shared Lives services, there is
well developed local experience of the promise of the
programme in terms of user satisfaction and
reductions in costs. The Worcester Reconnections
Trailblazer was a targeted intervention to reduce
loneliness, and thereby lead to improvements in
health outcomes. By reducing social isolation, service
recipients were expected to remain more active
(thereby reducing the likelihood of non-
communicable diseases linked to sedentary lifestyles).
This intervention was intended as a proof-of-concept
project to generate evidence about a personalized
approach to combating social isolation, thereby
reducing its harmful health effects.
The four Trailblazer interventions that were not
initiated lacked research evidence of effectiveness.
This was noted as a specific factor that contributed to
the decision not to commission the services in two
cases (Leeds and Cornwall). The research evidence
behind the proposed interventions in Sandwell and
East Lancashire was also weak. In summary, the SIB-
financing mechanism enables interventions with and
without the backing of research evidence to be
initiated. For those interventions without an evidence
base, local experience of the service engendering
confidence in the minds of commissioners (Shared
Lives), or a commitment to experimentation
(Worcester Reconnections) appeared to be significant
in garnering support.
The opportunities that SIB financing can offer
for evidence generation in a local intervention
In the five active Trailblazers, informants emphasised
that local administrative and descriptive data were
routinely analyzed and used to guide local decision-
making. Indeed, this enhanced use of data was cited
by informants as a central advantage of SIB-financed
work compared with their prior experience. This is a
consistent finding across UK SIB research (DWP, 2014;
Disley, Giacomantonio, Kruithof, & Sim, 2015).
Furthermore, interviews with the non-SIB-financed
comparator sites revealed that staff at these sites
drew less upon administrative and descriptive data
than the SIB-financed sites:
… there’s a lot of data processing that needs doing there
and we haven’t got the capacity to do it, and probably
not the knowledge to do that (Provider: non-SIB-
financed comparison site)
These findings align with arguments of SIB proponents
who posit that the SIB mechanism encourages more
reflective practice and improved capacity for active
oversight of programmes through enhanced data
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collection techniques, management systems and
sophisticated governance arrangements (Mulgan
et al., 2011; HM Government, 2011).
Nevertheless, the picture is more nuanced than that
presented by SIB proponents. An issue identified in the
SIB-financed Trailblazer sites, and not found in the
conventionally-financed comparator sites, related to
how locally-produced administrative data were used
to inform decisions about payments among the
respective parties (as opposed to local learning and
reflective practice). This increased the importance of
these data and sometimes led to conflict between
different parties (Fraser et al., 2018b). There is an
assumption among SIB proponents that the goals of
all parties can be aligned, and that more active and
extensive use of data will be intrinsically beneficial
(Mulgan et al., 2011; HM Government, 2011).
However, much of the increased local data collected
in these sites did not relate directly to the service
user outcomes in the commissioner contract but,
rather, to service provider processes, with important
implications for performance management.
We found a range of managerial approaches to
missed targets in the Trailblazers. In a number of
cases, these had serious financial implications for
service provider organizations:
We had a target of getting, I think it was seven [new
clients], I think by the end of March. So it was all gung-
ho to try and get that through. We missed it by one I
think. Now because of that I think we lost £600,000
worth of investment. So obviously that has had a big
impact on everybody really… That [money] was going
to come from the investors. But they wouldn’t give it to
us (Provider).
Evidently, the goals of investors may not necessarily be
aligned with those of service providers, service users
and commissioners. Withholding finance from service
providers in response to missed process targets was a
valid contractual response that also protected the
investors from further potential losses, but did not
necessarily advance the intervention locally, leading
instead to turbulence among the partner
organizations and significant financial strain for the
provider. It should be noted that in another
Trailblazer, missed process targets instead triggered
change management processes that enabled the
reorganization of service delivery in ways that were
welcomed by most subcontractors. It also led to a
contract renegotiation between the commissioners
and providers and revised targets and financial flows
among service providers that reflected what was
possible for the remainder of the contract period
rather than enforcing penalties for sustained
underperformance.
This link between increased process measurement
and organizational performance through the use of
administrative data pressurized some staff working
on the SIB-financed interventions. In interviews, some
informants recounted that the financial goals of the
SIB linked to local administrative data conflicted with
their professional goals and responsibilities to service
users (and intervention fidelity where applicable):
I would have liked to see [a service user] sit on the
programme for maybe a few months more. But from a
financial perspective and from the investors’ perspective
we had to [terminate the process]. In many ways, that
was okay, but having not had that SIB there, that side
of things there, I would have been advocating or
pushing further for a few months on the programme.
So that’s probably a really key example of where the
clash is (Provider).
For some informants working on SIB-financed
programmes, increased data collection attributed to
the SIB mechanism was interpreted as a disciplinary
device to focus service provider staff on achieving
outcomes-related rewards for the provider
organization as opposed to a collectively devised
method to refine service delivery through innovative
approaches that reflected a commitment to achieving
long term benefits for clients. We found some
examples of ‘gaming’ in the Trailblazers—as have
other SIB research teams (Edmiston & Nicholls, 2017;
DWP, 2014). However, we also found contrasting
signs of provider staff who were committed to
avoiding ‘gaming’, despite incentives to the contrary:
… because we are a… charity, we’ve been able to just
ignore the potential issues with payment by results,
which are that you cherry-pick and you don’t work
with the most in need. We have, anyway, just because
we see that as our role. Reputationally, it’d be rubbish
for us to just say, well, we’re going to work with these
easy people, and morally—why would you work for an
organization like this if you’re going to do that?
(Provider).
In some Trailblazers, we found that data collected by
service providers and local commissioners became
highly politicized, with debates among different
parties about the appropriate methodologies to
analyse and interpret the counterfactual evidence.
Once more, this was linked to the financial stakes
related to these data as they were used as evidence
to trigger payments. While there is the possibility for
adverse behaviours with other forms of financing, it is
notable that there were no such issues in the non-
SIB-financed comparator sites.
Finally, we found significant issues in relation to data
access. In one instance, it was impossible for all parties
to audit and validate the ways in which data were
collected and used due to NHS data governance
restrictions. In SIB-financed interventions (in the NHS
at least), there may sometimes be overly ambitious
assumptions as to what is achievable in terms of
increased data collection and local evidence
generation due to access issues. Furthermore, while it
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is possible that local data are used as a collaborative
learning device, these data may also be mobilized as
a disciplinary device.
The opportunities SIBs offer for formal
programme evaluation
There is a growing set of empirical studies commissioned
by the UK government that evaluate SIB programmes
(Disley et al., 2015; Mason, Lloyd, & Nash, 2017; Fraser
et al., 2018b). However, it is still the case that there is
little rigorous counterfactual comparison of SIBs versus
alternative methods of finance to deliver the same
service to the same type of users, and thus a lack of
evidence of the costs and benefits of SIBs compared
with alternative approaches to procurement (Fraser
et al., 2018a). All but two (Anders & Dorsett, 2017;
Spurling, 2017) of these UK evaluations have exclusively
reported qualitative findings and lack data about
quantitative outcomes and costs.
We distinguish between overarching evaluations
that seek to generate comparative data across a
number of SIBs such as the Trailblazer evaluation
(Fraser et al., 2018b), and focused local impact and
process evaluations of individual SIBs—such as the
Peterborough SIB evaluation work (Disley et al., 2015;
Anders & Dorsett, 2017). Our focus in this section is
on local evaluations of Trailblazers. It is unclear
sometimes how evaluations will be paid for—this can
inhibit the development of local evaluations:
All of the, the commissioners’ money that we’ve got is
going into reward payments to make that as big a pot
as possible to get the most outcomes. So no money
was kept aside for management [of the] evaluation
(Commissioner).
Of the five Trailblazer projects that were commissioned,
Newcastle Ways to Wellness and the London Rough
Sleeping SIB commissioned local impact evaluations
(assessing programme effectiveness against a
counterfactual financed by local commissioner and/or
central government funds). As with the Peterborough
evaluation (Disley et al., 2015), there have been some
contested issues related to data collection and
interpretation in Newcastle’s Ways to Wellness
Trailblazer. In some Trailblazers we found an implicit
assumption that any and all improvements in client
outcomes identified should be attributed to the SIB
intervention regardless of whether any local attempt
had been made to prove this through any impact
evaluation using a counterfactual (though Worcester
Reconnections did commission a local evaluation). This
runs counter to the early discourse of SIB proponents
who pointed to the rigour of the evaluation of the
Peterborough project (Mulgan et al., 2011, HM
Government, 2011). The original SIB model that the UK
government and others promoted included an
independent evaluation as routine to ensure that the
public purse would only pay for outcomes attributable
to the interventions financed by the SIB mechanism
(Fraser et al., 2018b). Empirical experience in the UK
would suggest that this is the exception rather than
the rule and that attribution is often assumed, as
opposed to independently proven. Additionally, cost-
effectiveness data are lacking from all UK SIBs.
Discussion
We found further evidence of the ‘strategic ambiguity’
(Eisenberg, 1984) within the SIB concept in the
Trailblazer evaluation. It can be applied to the
development of both interventions with and without a
strong positive evidence base (Maier et al., 2018).
Evidence from the Trailblazers suggests that the three
proposed interventions with some supportive evidence
were initiated, and most of those without research
evidence were not initiated. The Trailblazers
demonstrate that SIBs can indeed promote evidence-
informed programme implementation (i.e. programmes
which already have evidence of likely effectiveness).
Our findings suggest that SIB financing may bring
added value for an intervention like social prescribing,
as it is seen as a way to increase the evidence base. In
the case of TFCO-A, informants felt that a SIB was a
good way to transfer risk and set-up costs from
commissioners in a context of austerity. This study also
highlights that SIBs can lead to the initiation of
programmes for which research evidence does not yet
exist in order to enable experimentation as a way to
generate greater understanding of novel interventions.
Importantly, there are epistemological questions
concerning how we judge what a ‘positive evidence
base’ is, and wider debates about what counts as
‘good’ evidence for policy and practice. At different
times, policy-makers, practitioners and service users
may need to draw on different forms of knowledge
and ways of knowing, depending upon the questions
they seek to answer (Boaz et al., 2019). An interest in
knowing in advance that a programme has a ‘positive
evidence base’ may orient SIB proponents towards
academic research and interventions that have
already been developed and evaluated using
established research designs such as randomized
controlled trials and systematic reviews. There are
advantages in policy-makers carefully considering the
evidence underpinning different interventions. Where
their primary question is ‘what works’ (i.e. the
question is one of relative effectiveness), there are
well established ‘hierarchies of evidence’ based on
study design (Boaz et al., 2019). Such approaches
categorize evidence strength and quality based on
criteria that privilege quantitative study design and
value internal validity. More problematically, however,
hierarchies based on study design exclude important
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forms of evidence and underrate the value of good
observational studies—moreover they fail to develop
programme theory—i.e. how and why interventions
may work, and tend to disregard the importance of
local context (Boaz et al., 2019). The prioritization of
quantitative evidence over qualitative evidence in
SIB-financed interventions, while understandable
given the need to measure relative effectiveness in
order to pay the investors may limit the potential for
programme learning, stifle innovation, and increase
pressure on provider staff and create incentives for
‘creaming’ (Warner, 2013; Roy et al., 2017).
Academic research is just one type of evidence that
may be helpful for policy and practice decisions
(Oliver, Lorenc, & Innvær, 2014; Boaz et al., 2019). An
important form of evidence is locally-produced
administrative or descriptive data. A claim made by SIB
proponents is that the SIB-financing mechanism, and
the increased rigour it brings, may deliver enhanced
data monitoring techniques and skills to third sector
providers that have historically been seen as lacking in
this regard (Callanan & Law, 2012). The importance of
extensive, ongoing performance monitoring and
concurrent independent evaluation is emphasised by
SIB proponents as a way of ensuring that outcome
payments are earned in a valid and attributable way
(Cox, 2011). SIBs potentially offer the opportunity to
draw on more (and better quality) administrative,
descriptive and management data. Paying for
outcomes might be expected to encourage increased
and improved local data collection (Cox, 2011). This in
turn might increase transparency of practice for
commissioners and third sector providers and increase
accountability of programmes overall (Stoesz, 2014).
Nonetheless, implementing evidence-informed
interventions is highly complex, relies on the
development of valued relationships over time and
assumes shared conceptions as to what evidence is
(Oliver et al., 2014). While the Trailblazers promoted
increased data collection compared to non-SIB sites,
this sometimes led to increased financial pressure on
provider organizations and increased managerial
pressure on provider staff, with potentially
detrimental implications. We identified a danger that
because performance data become so closely related
to payment, they may become a focus for disputes
between different parties and are thus counter-
productive in that these data may reduce providers’
focus on service user outcomes, and may introduce
perverse incentives and damage inter-organizational
relationships (Warner, 2013; Roy et al., 2017). Our
findings support the findings of other studies into
SIBs in the UK which highlight that (as with other
forms of payment by results) SIB-financed
programmes can lead to ‘gaming’ (DWP, 2014;
Edmiston & Nicholls, 2017) which may weaken the
validity of locally-produced administrative data in SIB
programmes. It is important to note that we found
evidence of provider resistance to such pressure.
SIB proponents highlight the potential SIBs hold for
wider learning about what works in terms of preventive
policy-making (Mulgan et al., 2011; HM Government,
2011). Because SIB-financed interventions promise to
pay a return to investors, it is important that public
stakeholders are assured that any outcomes associated
with SIB interventions are attributable to the
interventions themselves, despite the increased costs
that more robust evaluation may imply. It may be the
case that the commercial sensitivities of investors
militate against the commissioning of independent
evaluation (Warner, 2013). The opportunity for in-depth
evaluation makes the SIB concept of particular interest
to the academic community and evaluation specialists
(Fox & Morris, 2019). There are opportunities to combine
(quantitative) impact evaluations with (qualitative)
process evaluations and cost-effectiveness studies of
SIBs, thereby furthering knowledge of ‘what works, why,
when and for whom’ (Pawson, Tilley, & Tilley, 1997)—
delivering research which transcends traditional
‘hierarchies of evidence’ of effectiveness and closer to a
comprehensive approach to evaluation (Boaz et al.,
2019) that includes qualitative as well as quantitative
data. Worryingly, only two of the Trailblazers included
impact evaluations. In the remaining three cases,
payments were linked to performance targets assessed
at intervals in simple before-and-after terms as opposed
to counterfactual impact evaluation. This finding aligns
with what has been found elsewhere in UK SIBs and
‘payment by results’ programmes (Fox & Morris, 2019).
The lack of impact and cost-effectiveness evaluation is
problematic as it runs counter to the original SIB
concept that in SIBs, government would only pay for
‘what works’ demonstrably.
Conclusion
We conclude this paper with learning points for
practitioners and managers—public commissioners in
particular—from this research and highlight questions
that may be worthy of consideration from a public
management perspective before deciding to enter into
a SIB-financed arrangement. Giacomantonio’s (2017)
analysis suggests that the more attractive a SIB is for
investors, the less attractive it is likely to be for public
commissioners and vice versa. This paradox is rendered
even starker in relation to interventions that are
robustly evidenced already and poses a major question
for commissioners: why should they pay the extra
transaction costs associated with a SIB (Giacomantonio,
2017; Fraser et al., 2018b) for programmes that they
already know work? Empirically, the Trailblazers offer
some reasons why they might. In the context of
austerity, a SIB offers access to new financial streams
and increased (non-financial) support for management
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and delivery of services up-front. Additionally, in the case
of the three Trailblazer interventions with the most
previous research into their effectiveness (Manchester,
Newcastle and London)—the jury is still out as to their
overall effectiveness and transferability. Therefore,
realistically, there remains no guarantee of local
effectiveness, and SIB-financing may be expected to
spread some of the implementation risk among a wider
set of actors than the public commissioners. For already
more strongly evidenced interventions, a question to
consider may be whether it can be assumed that the
intervention will produce the required outcome without
the need for local proof or how much local evidence is
needed to establish the effectiveness of the
intervention locally.
A further question for commissioners is how can a
judicious distribution of risk among respective SIB-
linked parties be found? We have written elsewhere in
more detail about the different forms of risk that
ought to be considered in SIBs (Fraser et al., 2018b).
Commissioners need to carefully consider how they
can best influence the alignment of interests between
service users, providers, investors, intermediaries and
themselves through procurement by specifying the
interconnectedness between improved social
outcomes, different forms of risk and outcome pricing.
We hope these findings may aid such considerations.
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